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The incredible irony of juxtaposing Angola’s massive natural wealth alongside 
conflict, poverty and great suffering has been noted by many who have studied its 
history and politics. In his well-known book on Angola’s political economy, Tony 
Hodges opens with this “terrible, shocking paradox,” writing “few countries present 
such a stark contrast between economic potential and the state of their populace.”1 
Although Hodges’ book was primarily about the two natural resources that fuelled the 
final stretches of Angola’s devastating civil war—oil and diamonds—one need not dig 
too deep (so to speak) to find other examples of Angola’s wealth.  
Blessed with abundant fertile land, especially in the central plateau region, 
colonial Angola was not only self-sufficient in food production but also an exporter of 
cereals and cash crops. The failure of the colonial market system was a blow to 
agricultural production.2 Ongoing conflict disrupted the ability of food producers to 
cultivate and especially to transport their products. Since the end of the civil war in 
2002, the Angolan state has had to rebuild the country. The entire non-oil economy was 
devastated by the war and large segments of the population were internally displaced. In 
this context, state development planning takes on new urgency. 
Various models of state-led development have been proposed to understand 
structural change. As McMillan and Headey write: “Structural change entails the 
movement of labor from low productivity sectors like agriculture into more modern 
sectors of the economy.”3 Of course, it also involves raising the productivity of the 
agricultural sector and linking it to industrial processing. In the past half-century, the 
most notable case of late-industrialization is found in the newly industrialized countries 
(NICs) of East Asia. The so-called East Asian Tigers–Japan, Hong Kong, South Korea, 
Singapore and Taiwan—all achieved high growth and industrialization through the 
1980s and 90s based on an export-oriented economy. In each case, the state planned out 
and facilitated this economic development through coordination with the national elite, 
making use of regulation, incentivization schemes, and other state interference in the 
“natural” operation of the market. The concept of a “developmental state”4 became an 
explanation for the East Asian “economic miracle,” and in more recent times, an 
important aspect of the argument against the neoliberal free-market approach of the 
World Bank and International Monetary Fund (IMF) and for state intervention. In fact, 
Ha-Joon Chang5 argues that interventionist economic policies were used by every 
industrializing country since Britain’s industrial revolution and are therefore necessary 
to foster economic and social development. 
There are numerous and competing definitions of the developmental state. 
Distilled to its core, a developmental state is oriented to promote developmental 
outcomes—chiefly economic growth and to a lesser extent poverty alleviation.6 One of 
the more robust definitions comes from Castells: “A state is developmental when it 
establishes as its principle of legitimacy, its ability to promote and sustain development, 
understanding by development the combination of steady high rates of growth and 
structural change in the productive system, both domestically and in its relationship to 
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the international economy... Thus, ultimately for the developmental state, economic 
development is not a goal but a means.”7  
Meyns and Musamba write: “When reference is made to the “developmental 
state” we think of East and South East Asian countries and not usually about Africa. For 
the past few years, however, there has been a noticeable interest in academic as well as 
development cooperation circles in the usefulness of the concept for political-economic 
conditions in Africa.”8 The developmental state has been applied to Botswana, 
Mauritius, Ghana, South Africa, and other countries. Elsewhere, building on the work of 
David Sogge9, the term has been applied by Ovadia10 to Angola, though Sogge 
ultimately concluded Angola did not meet the essential criteria. It may initially be 
difficult to accept the notion of Angola as a developmental state given the widespread 
poverty and dreadful lack of basic state functions outside of Luanda. However, since 
2002 there has been a flurry of new infrastructure and investment in roads, railways, 
ports, dams, electrification (even of slums or musseques), and construction of schools, 
hospitals and other basic institutions. This investment has extended to most of the 
provincial capitals and perhaps to some municipalities in more populous and prosperous 
provinces, but not significantly beyond those areas. 
Much has been made of Angola’s incredible post-war economic growth (see 
Table 1). Although sharply affected by the global financial crisis, the IMF estimates 
GDP growth had already risen past 5 percent and (prior to the oil price shock and its 
particularly hard-felt impacts in Angola) expected growth to remain between 6-7 
percent for the next five years. Such statistics are only useful to a point given the 
notorious unreliability of GDP statistics in general and in specifically in sub-Saharan 
Africa. Additionally, the statistics are less impressive when Angola’s starting point is 
taken into consideration. Despite new local content efforts,11 the oil sector still remains 
largely an enclave sector. Nevertheless, impressive growth is occurring—even in the 
non-oil economy.12 In terms of poverty alleviation, Angola has also clearly made 
impressive gains in key human development indicators and progress toward the 
millennium development goals.13 
 
Table 1 - Percent Change in GDP 2002-2011 
2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 
14.5 3.3 11.2 20.6 20.7 22.6 13.8 2.4 3.4 3.9 
Source: IMF World Economic Outlook Database, October 2013 
It is not all a rosy picture for Angola’s post-war development project. Much has 
been made of Angola’s “illiberal peacebuilding approach”14 and the high levels of state 
repression. However, authoritarianism is not incompatible with developmentalism. In 
fact, as Ben Fine argues developmental states are commonly, if not universally 
authoritarian.15 In the introduction to their book on The Democratic Developmental 
State, it almost seems Robinson and White have Angola in mind when then write that 
many developmental states are “illiberal states” where capital accumulation is by means 
of “corrupt and illegal practices” and “self-interested elites use patronage networks and 
capture economic power to protect their positions through force and subterfuge” so that 
enrichment is for a small group of individuals to the detriment of the vast majority.16 
While some may see authoritarianism and neopatrimonial relations as a driver of 
economic development and even poverty alleviation,17 I will argue that the heavily 
centralized and top-down approach of the governing Movimento Popular de Libertação 
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de Angola (MPLA) in highly detrimental to in many respects, but most notably when it 
comes to promoting the agricultural sector and encouraging rural development. 
 
The Role of Agriculture in Angola’s Development Planning 
 
Agriculture is often overlooked in the literature on late industrialization. Yet, in 
a context where the majority of Angolans earn their livelihoods from agriculture, it is 
hard to imagine structural change (as per Castells’ definition of a developmental state) 
without significant government intervention in agriculture. In this paper, I will review 
the importance of agriculture and rural development for the promotion of developmental 
outcomes in Angola. Angola cannot properly by considered a developmental state, let 
alone a democratic developmental state. However, there are significant aspects of state-
led development in terms of oil and gas, industrial policy, housing and infrastructure.18 
Recent progress in agriculture promotion in Angola will be analyzed with reference to 
agricultural investment and job creation using data collected from Angola’s National 
Private Investment Agency (Agência Nacional para o Investimento Privado, or ANIP), 
which generally targets commercial farms. The limits of Angola’s development model 
are then reviewed through a case study of the challenges facing the government’s 
signature agricultural initiative, Aldeia Nova. More than $100 million has been spent to 
create a project supporting 600 families of ex-combatants. Although those families and 
even the surrounding areas have benefitted from the project, which was envisioned to be 
a model for rural development around the country, it has become a prime example 
amongst Angolan development practitioners, agronomists, and civil society 
organizations of waste and misplaced priorities.  
According to estimates from the Angolan Ministry of Agriculture and Rural 
Development, the agricultural sector in 2008 employed roughly 4.7 million Angolans, 
or 63 percent of the working population. Slightly more than half the population (54 
percent) was estimated to live in rural areas.19 In another study, they found that there 
were 1,861,252 family farms in Angola, as compared to 8,106 commercial farms.20 
Taken together, these numbers suggest that it would be impossible to achieve 
developmental outcomes for the majority of Angolans or reduce poverty in Angola 
without focusing on agriculture. Indeed, Sam Moyo argues that “Addressing the 
agrarian question… is widely recognized in the literature on developmental states as 
having been critical to generating developmental success.”21 Although he is writing 
mainly about South Africa, Moyo contends that agrarian reform must be a part of 
addressing the developmental challenges facing southern Africa as a region; securing 
food security, addressing high levels of unemployment, poverty and inequality, 
transforming productive forces (i.e. land and labour) and industrialization. His 
conclusion, that South Africa is unlikely to become a developmental state without 
agrarian reform,22 is no doubt equally applicable to Angola.23 
As many authors have shown, developmental states gain legitimacy by 
increasing the standard of living for a majority of citizens.24 In the introduction to his 
edited volume Constructing a Democratic Developmental State in South Africa, Omano 
Edigheji writes: “One important policy tool that has been adopted by most 
developmental states to reduce poverty, address the legacy of dispossession, transform 
the structure of their economies and ensure equitable growth is agrarian reform.” His 
basis for noting this policy is that “Equitable growth, which should be the major aim of 
the democratic developmental state, would be near impossible without agrarian 
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reform.”25 As Moyo, writing in the same volume, notes, agrarian reform may involve 
land reform, enhanced security of land tenure, and interventions that support agro-
industrial growth and diversification. As with industrial policy, Moyo argues that 
agrarian reforms in the Southern African Development Community (SADC) need to be 
undertaken in the wider context of a national development strategy to enhance 
accumulation and create significant multiplier effects throughout the economy.26 This 
logic is counter to the dominant perspective that in much of sub-Saharan Africa the 
existing agro-industrial base is sufficient and competitive enough, but agricultural 
exports are limited by weak concessions to foreign investment and the inefficiency of 
small producers.27 
When it comes to Angola, the context of 30 years of war has created even 
greater need for government intervention to support agricultural development. Angola is 
a “high food-production deficit” country in that it imports more than 50 percent of their 
cereal consumption requirements.28 As Table 2 shows, the country has by far the most 
negative balance of trade in the region when it comes to food and agriculture. 
According to more recent statistics (Table 3), that negative balance has only increased 
in recent years. While Table 2 shows a balance of negative US$1,719 million in 
2004/05 for food and agriculture, Table 3 shows that the negative balance had increased 
to US$2,127 million by 20010 and US$3,077 million by 2012. The largest increases in 
agricultural imports have been in live animals, meat and dairy. The reliance on imported 
food and food products is particularly damaging for food security in Angola given the 
effect of oil exports on the cost of imports. The figures are also cause for concern given 
Angola’s potential for agricultural self-sufficiency. 
 
Table 2 - Agricultural and Food Trade (US$Million), SADC 2004/05 
Country Agricultural Trade Food Trade 
Exports Imports Balance Exports Imports Balance 
Angola 6 985 -979 1 741 -740 
Botswana 52 126 -74 49 92 -43 
DRC 39 336 -297 8 227 -219 
Lesotho 6 60 -54 1 47 -46 
Madagascar 122 90 32 104 80 24 
Malawi 397 100 297 76 59 17 
Mauritius 429 426 3 371 335 36 
Mozambique 124 343 -219 0 301 -301 
Namibia 249 278 -29 145 197 -52 
Seychelles 1 78 -77 6 67 -61 
South Africa 4184 2753 1431 2680 1731 949 
Swaziland 272 74 198 242 54 188 
Tanzania 534 342 192 146 278 -132 
Zambia 322 173 149 159 139 20 
Zimbabwe 847 468 379 115 371 -256 
SADC 7584 6632 952 4103 4719 -616 
Source: Moyo, “The Agrarian Question,” 294, citing World Bank 2007 
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Agriculture is not a high priority in terms of public investment. In fact, the 
priorities set in this area by the Angolan government are a good example of the 
downside of its overall approach to development. Aside from Aldeia Nova, agriculture 
and rural development has been largely ignored. The entire budget of the Rural 
Extension Program for 2009 was a mere US$30 million. To make matters worse, the 
program was only able to access 10 percent of this money.29 
 
Table 3 - Agriculture and Food Trade (US$Million), Angola 2010-2012 
Product 2010 2011 2012 
Exports Imports Balance Exports Imports Balance Exports Imports Balance 
Live Animals 0.0 5.0 -5.0 0.0 5.7 -5.7 0.0 15.6 -15.6 
Meat 0.0 666.0 -666.0 0.0 987.3 -987.3 0.0 1089.2 -1089.2 
Fish 12.3 90.7 -78.4 11.0 120.6 -109.5 14.4 155.8 -141.4 
Dairy 0.5 197.2 -196.7 0.0 252.7 -252.7 0.0 279.4 -279.4 
Vegetables, 
Fruits & Nuts 
0.0 205.6 -205.6 0.1 248.7 -248.6 0.2 283.7 -283.5 
Cereals, Flour 
& Milk 
2.7 540.6 -537.9 0.4 754.4 -754.0 0.0 735.6 -735.6 
Animal Fats 
& Oils 0.1 249.9 -249.8 0.5 420.8 -420.3 2.0 314.7 -312.8 
Sugars 0.1 187.9 -187.8 0.0 239.7 -239.7 0.0 219.9 -219.9 
TOTALS 15.8 2142.9 -2127.2 12.0 3029.8 -3017.8 16.6 3093.8 -3077.2 
Source: Author’s Calculations from UNCTAD ITC Trademap, 
http://www.trademap.org/Index.aspx. 
 
The lack of attention paid to agriculture and especially the family farming 
sector, is particularly problematic given the link between agricultural development in 
Angola and development of the entire non-oil economy. Within the context of a national 
development strategy, agricultural production can broaden demand for industrial goods 
and services. As Moyo notes: “The current narrowly-based trajectory of agrarian 
accumulation constrains overall (industrial) development, while continuing the reliance 
on imported agricultural inputs and markets, at the expense of small producers and 
domestic food security and food sovereignty.”30 In this way, agricultural development is 
not only necessary for human development; it is also linked to overall economic 
development of the non-oil economy, which is a strategic imperative for the Angolan 
state.  
 
Agricultural Investment and Job Creation in Angola 
 
While there has been insufficient public spending on rural development outside 
the Aldeia Nova project, there has been increasing private investment in Angola as the 
country rebuilds from its civil war and experiences the high levels of GDP growth 
discussed above. All foreign investment in Angola must be reported to ANIP. 
Additionally, much Angolan private investment is also reported to ANIP so that the 
investors can qualify for significant tax incentives. The incentives, granted by Law 
17/03 in July 2003,31 grant tax exemptions and special rules for the repatriation of 
profits for a certain number of years based on what part of the country the investment is 
6 
 
 
 
made (with additional incentives for investing in areas of greater need). The data does 
not include private investment from China made under the loan arrangements with 
China Exim Bank, as discussed in Ovadia32 and Campos and Vines.33 The large Chinese 
loans made in 2004 and 2007 and totalling at least US$4.5 billion involve 
US$223,760,172 for agricultural projects and US$306,847,509 for fisheries.34 
 
Table 4 - Angolan Jobs Created from Private Investment in Agriculture, Forestry and 
Fisheries (2005-2009) 
  2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 TOTAL 
Bengo 101 0 0 170 105 376 
Benguela 37 0 525 150 0 712 
Bie 0 0 162 88 0 250 
Cabinda 0 0 44 56 36 136 
Cuando 
Cubango 
0 0 0 0 0 0 
Cunene 0 0 0 62 43 105 
Huambo 0 143 104 0 15 262 
Huila 0 0 120 0 0 120 
Kwanza Norte 0 0 0 45 15 60 
Kwanze Sul 136 123 137 0 20 416 
Luanda 15 145 214 54 91 519 
Lunda Norte 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Lunda Sul 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Malange 0 0 42 27 655 724 
Moxico 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Namibe 454 0 1 0 0 455 
Uige 86 0 217 65 0 368 
Zaire 0 42 0 0 0 42 
Other/Various 158 110 0 0 0 268 
TOTAL 987 563 1566 717 980 4813 
Source: ANIP 
 
While investment by the government, including the Chinese investment, can 
directed to small farms, private investment in agriculture is generally directed at 
commercial farms. When investment is registered with ANIP, it must meet certain 
criteria for the numbers of Angolan jobs it creates and the number of jobs it creates 
relative to expatriate jobs. Therefore, data is available both for the value of investment 
and official job creation. The number of jobs created may at first seem inconsequential, 
however given the high levels of investment relative to low job creation, the reliability 
of the data on employment is unclear. Although it does not shed much light on how 
much employment is being created, it is perhaps more useful for trying to understand 
how the benefit from private investment in agriculture is being spread around the 
country. 
The data, covering the period 2005-2009, is for all private investment in 
agriculture, forestry and fisheries. Broken down by province, the data shows in Tables 4 
and 5, show a complete lack of investment in Cuando Cubango, Lunda Norte and Sul, 
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and Moxico. Over 85 percent of the investment was directed at four provinces: Luanda, 
Malange, Benguela and Kwanza Sul. The pattern of investment, despite the fact that 
Luanda and Benguela are in the zone with the least amount of government incentives 
under Law 17/03 and Cuando Cubango and Moxico are in the zone with the highest 
incentives, suggests that that the incentive structure is not succeeding in directing 
investment to priority areas.35  
 
Table 5 - Private Investment in Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries by Province (2005-
2009) 
  2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 TOTAL 
Bengo $953,000 - - $4,942,000 $6,768,000 $12,663,000 
Benguela $4,900,000 - $18,062,000 $4,989,000 - $27,951,000 
Bie - - $352,000 $532,000 - $884,000 
Cabinda - - $677,000 $4,213,000 $1,890,000 $6,780,000 
Cuando 
Cubango - - - - - $0 
Cunene - - - $907,000 $83,000 $990,000 
Huambo - $2,890,000 $781,000 - $1,700,000 $5,371,000 
Huila - - $7,106,000 - - $7,106,000 
Kwanza 
Norte - - - $4,207,000 $200,000 $4,407,000 
Kwanze Sul $4,103,000 $8,647,000 $13,914,000 - $4,892,000 $31,556,000 
Luanda $1,259,000 $3,421,000 $3,988,000 $2,888,000 $6,102,000 $17,658,000 
Lunda Norte - - - - - $0 
Lunda Sul - - - - - $0 
Malange - - $2,586,000 $1,250,000 $354,076,000 $357,912,000 
Moxico - - - - - $0 
Namibe $1,387,000 $8,650,000 $3,570,000 - - $13,607,000 
Uige $1,253,000 - $6,187,000 $4,188,000 - $11,628,000 
Zaire - $2,343,000 - - - $2,343,000 
Other/Various $4,950,000 $4,714,000 - - - $9,664,000 
TOTAL $18,805,000 $30,665,000 $57,223,000 $28,116,000 $375,711,000 $510,520,000 
 Source: ANIP 
 
It is also important to note that almost 70 percent of total investment over the 
five-year period was made in 2009 to one project in Malange. Although the data does 
not specify what this investment is for, it is likely a joint Angolan-Brazilian biofuels 
project that involves the state oil company, Sonangol. In Table 6, the investment is 
broken down by country of origin. Even without the large project in Malange, much of 
the investment is Angolan in origin. The amount of total investment from Israel, despite 
the involvement of Israeli companies in the Aldeia Nova project, suggests that their 
investment in Aldeia Nova may be exempted from the normal regime for foreign 
investment, as happened with China’s investment under the Exim Bank loans.  
 
Table 6 – Private Investment in Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries by Country of 
Origin (2005-2009) 
  2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 TOTAL 
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Angola $10,500,000 $25,701,000 $38,260,000 $15,922,000 $289,613,000 $379,996,000 
Brazil - - - - $76,742,000 $76,742,000 
Portugal $1,352,000 $4,964,000 $7,722,000 $5,948,000 $3,191,000 $23,177,000 
Israel - - - - $5,915,000 $5,915,000 
South Africa $4,900,000 - - $532,000 - $5,432,000 
Cyprus - - $677,000 $4,213,000 - $4,890,000 
Spain - - $4,100,000 - - $4,100,000 
Panama - - $2,586,000 - - $2,586,000 
Sweden - - $2,000,000 - - $2,000,000 
China $800,000 - $678,000 - $250,000 $1,728,000 
Holland - - - $1,501,000 - $1,501,000 
France $1,253,000 - - - - $1,253,000 
Germany - - $1,200,000 - - $1,200,000  
    TOTAL $510,520,000 
Source: ANIP 
 
The data from ANIP provides solid evidence that investors – particularly Angolan 
investors – are beginning to invest in commercial agriculture in Angola. While this 
development is certainly positive in terms of economic growth, industrialization (for the 
reasons described above) and diversification of the economy away from petroleum, the 
legitimacy of Angola’s developmental state will only be maintained through rural 
development, poverty alleviation, more equitable development, greater freedom and more 
participatory government. As the case of Aldeia Nova demonstrates, there is still a long way 
to go to meet those objectives; and in many respects the MPLA government continues to 
move in the wrong direction. 
 
Aldeia Nova – The ‘White Elephant’ of Rural Development in Angola 
 
The case of the Aldeia Nova project typifies the approach to development taken 
by the Angolan government and is useful for highlighting both the sincere desire to 
modernize and the follies of a highly centralized top-down approach to national 
development. A detailed case analysis will be followed by more general comments 
about the theoretical implications for agricultural development in Angola. For Angolan 
rural development specialists and agronomists, Aldeia Nova has come to symbolise the 
government’s misplaced priorities. This ‘white elephant’ project to build a model 
agricultural community for 600 families of ex-combatants on both sides of the civil war 
was launched in December 2003 in Wako Kungo district of Kwanza Sul province. 
Although those families and even the surrounding areas have benefitted from the 
project, which was envisioned to be a model for rural development around the country, 
the more than US$100 million spent to date36 along with the lack of consultation 
involved in this Israeli-operated scheme make the project an example of unsustainable 
development and wasteful spending in the eyes of Angolan development practitioners.37 
Noting that the cost per individual is 100 times the average spent on 
demobilisation, a study from Centro Cultural Mosaiko, an Angolan civil society 
organisation, concluded that “The Aldeia Nova Project is perhaps the most expensive 
investment made in the agricultural sector since independence, yet the investment was 
made without studies of adequate rigor and required seriousness.”38 Yet, there have 
been successes in the Aldeia Nova project despite the cost. The project produces some 
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of the only Angolan agricultural produce to reach the capital of Luanda in a formerly 
agriculturally rich and fertile country scarred by a war, including sugar, various grains, 
eggs, milk and milk products, beef, chicken, and pork. 
According to Ayal Kimhi, an academic who visited the project as a guest of the 
Israeli contractors working on the project, the biggest successes have been in dairy and 
egg production. Kimhi notes that egg farmers in particular have average incomes in 
excess of five times the official minimum wage. Recent years have seen increases in the 
efficiency of agricultural production. He also notes that the net agricultural income of 
the 600 project families totalled US$207,000,39 and calculates that “the direct impact of 
the project on regional economic activity will exceed $3.5 million annually.” He goes 
on to write: 
 
This direct income figure does not take into account the lion's share of the 
millions of additional dollars spent on livestock feed and other production 
inputs, at least part of which are spent within the region. Indirectly, this 
income generates demand for goods and services that has a multiplier effect 
on the economy of the region. Additionally, as a result of the profitability of 
farming, project families now hire local residents to work in their fields.40 
 
In 2010, Aldeia Nova was known as one of the only places in Angola with a 
consistent 24-hour electricity supply, due to the constant use of backup generators. 
While Kimhi argues that the accompanying infrastructure for the Aldeia Nova project 
will benefit the wider region, many development practitioners note the development 
lavished on this small community is atypical for the country as a whole. Aldeia Nova 
was viewed as a model village to be replicated throughout the country. While plans 
were drawn up to start similar projects in two other provinces, the plans were scrapped 
in the wake of the financial crisis on 2009.  
What Angola is therefore left with is a very expensive, technology and heavy 
machinery intensive project dependent on Israeli and Brazilian consultants and inputs 
such as fertiliser and feed that are imported from abroad. There is investment planned in 
various irrigation schemes, however, most often the increments of yield do not justify 
the investment. The pumping system is unaffordable due to the cost of fuel for backup 
generators.41 The infrastructure for electricity and clean water was supplied by foreign 
firms as well and requires their continued involvement in its upkeep. For example, 
according to the website of the Israeli company Dorot which designed and implemented 
the system for clean water supply, Israeli technology, valves, and pumps were used in 
the project and a professional is required to check the system annually.42 
In the interest of searching ‘for better models of sustainable development in 
Angola, namely one that is economically viable, socially just, environmentally 
appropriate and which can be appropriate for national and local institutions and human 
resources,’ Centro Cultural Mosaiko’s study of Aldeia Nova began by reviewing the 
history of development and colonialism in the Cela municipality of Kwanzal Sul, where 
Aldeia Nova is located. The region has a long history of failed state-led agricultural 
projects dating back to Portuguese colonialism in the early 20th century.  Massive 
Portuguese investment led to the building of needed infrastructure and services in the 
region during that time period. However while many indigenous people were forced off 
their land, the settlers lacked the necessary training and skills and were unable to adopt 
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the production systems that were imposed on them, which were not suitable to local 
conditions. Eventually, many abandoned the project. 
Centro Cultural Mosaiko’s study concludes that the colonial agricultural project 
in Cela was based on a model of “closed supervision,” which was authoritarian and 
lacked participatory decision-making. Direction was centrally imposed on farmers, who 
did not have freedom to deviate from the rules. This model, they argue, was the primary 
reason for the failure of rural development in the region. Although costs were extremely 
high for the colonial state, the project went ahead without any study of the natural and 
social conditions of the region.  
Because of the inherited infrastructure, the Cela area became important for the 
Government of Angola after independence. State farms and factories were privatized in 
the late 1980s. Since 2002, government officials and others linked to the state have 
acquired numerous farms.43 These farms also benefit from the massive infrastructure 
investment in the region that has accompanied the Aldeia Nova project. According to 
Fernando Pacheco, a leading Angolan expert in rural development, investment in 
irrigation, which constitutes a large portion of overall agricultural spending, mostly 
benefits large farms in the hands of the elite instead of family farms.44  
In many ways, the approach of the Angolan government toward Aldeia Nova 
mirrors the approach of the Portuguese colonial government. Since the start of the 
Aldeia Nova project, there has been a lack of coordination with other government 
investment in the region. For example, the government invested around US$12.7 
million through the state budget, while the Fundo de Desenvolvimento Económico e 
Social invested another US$10 million on several projects including a dairy factory. 
These investments were made without consultation with Aldeia Nova, which had 
already commissioned a new dairy factory. 45 46 
Another way in which the current project replicates the previous colonial 
experience is that farmers are forced to cultivate or raise animals in accordance with the 
decision of the project. Farmers are not allowed to do extra activities such as raise 
animals or plant crops that are outside the official plans. Additionally, they are obliged 
to acquire the agricultural inputs and sell their products to the project, which is 
administered by a team of 12 Israelis who also provide technical assistance. This 
underscores Moyo’s warning that in SADC countries, “The focus of public resource 
allocation towards a narrow, inputs import-intensive and export-oriented, large-scale 
farming sector, has entrenched the disarticulation of domestic agro-industrialization, 
and retained a narrow home market.”47  
There are some important positive aspects of the project. Former soldiers from 
both sides of the conflict live and work together and have been given compensation for 
their service, which allowed money to circulate initially through the town. As many as 
600 jobs were created (though 3,000 were predicted), while participants received access 
to banking and credit services. Some of the technology has been very helpful in 
increasing yields, which in some cases have been quite good. The project has also had a 
wider benefit in the region, which has more businesses selling agricultural and building 
materials and higher levels of trade and development than other similar regions of the 
country. However, the project “produced” poverty through forced expulsions and 
exclusion of local villagers. The amount given to producers for housing was insufficient 
to build decent housing. Therefore, the Centro Cultural Mosaiko study calls the situation 
“a case of clamorous social injustice” and notes that this injustice is compounded by the 
fact that injured parties are not allowed to complain.48 
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Even Kimhi acknowledges that there were weaknesses in the project; according 
to him, these include the optimistic construction timetable, lower agricultural production 
due to the shortage of feed, and what he calls “social issues” (alcoholism, polygamy, 
property crime, and so forth). However, in making these concessions on the one hand 
yet justifying them on the other, Kimhi devalues the knowledge of project participants 
in ways that mirror the racist beliefs of many European colonialists. Without criticizing 
nor providing any basis for the project’s presumption that Angolans are incapable of 
understanding delayed return on investment, he writes:  
 
The Logistics Center does not pay farmers the market price for their output 
and does not charge them market price for their inputs. The underlying 
philosophy is that farmers are not yet mentally ready to pay real input prices 
even if they know that they will get good output prices. Rather, it is 
presumed that if the farmers were to initially be charged real input prices 
they would prefer not to buy the expensive inputs and would therefore 
return to traditional cultivation techniques.49 
 
In fact, there are many more weaknesses to the project. Despite the heavy 
investment, Aldeia Nova has not reached the target production levels in terms of annual 
production set out in the initial project proposal for most of its products. Table 7 shows 
that the only category in which production has met these targets is egg production. All 
other production was significantly below target for the most recent year data is 
available. Even the Minister of Agriculture, Rural Development and Fisheries 
acknowledged difficulties in its implementation phase due to the production costs.50 
 
Table 7 – Targeted and Actual Production Yields for Aldeia Nova 
 Target Yield Actual Yield 
(2007) 
Actual Yield 
(2008) 
Grains (tonnes) 44,000 18.9 Data unknown51 
Fruits & vegetables 
(tonnes) 
630 54.7 48.5 
Milk (litres) 4,000,000 583,234 931,478 
Beef (tonnes) 280 8.3 13.2 
Pork (tonnes) 1000 1.9 7.0 
Chickens (tonnes) 3000 0.5 210.1 
Eggs 22,300,000 6,125,257 22,661,591 
Sources: Centro Cultural Mosaiko52; Kimhi.53 
 
The planners never accounted for inequality of benefit (for example, the fact 
that, for example, an egg producer typically will earn twice what a milk producer earns) 
and they failed to recognise the discontent that would rise as farmers were forced to pay 
the project higher than market prices for fertiliser, feed and other inputs. It was, 
according to Centro Cultural Mosaiko, it was the “lack of coordination and 
communication between administrators and producers” that has led to low yields. 
Additionally, a the failure to conduct proper feasibility studies prior to launching the 
project, the lack of planning and foresight that made it go significantly over budget, the 
failure to learn from past mistakes, the selection of crops that previous research had 
shown were unsuitable for the area and its conditions (such as wheat, which colonial 
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research suggested should be abandoned), and a management style that stifled 
“individual initiative, creativity and freedom of choice” in a way that is “inconceivable 
in the modern world” are responsible for the project’s shortcomings.54 
To understand the extent to which Aldeia Nova is an example of misplaced 
resources, it is necessary to examine the larger context of rural development in Angola. 
Although the Angolan government says many of the right things about fighting poverty 
and promoting rural development in their policy statements, in practice the government 
ignores the needs of small-holding family farms, though more than 99 percent of 
farmers fall into this category and nearly 95 percent of Angolan farmland is cultivated 
by such farms. Roughly 80 percent of Angolans are employed in Agriculture. However, 
as noted above, a relatively small amount of state funding is available for rural 
extension work. CEIC has advocated for better transportation networks, access to credit, 
technical assistance and promotion of rural trade, concluding that “agricultural 
production could be noticeably higher if more attention were given to the Rural 
Outreach Program, an essential tool for the empowerment of farmers.”55  
However, even in the Public Investment Programme, the government’s signature 
national development strategy, agricultural projects represented only 2.2 percent of the 
overall budget in 2009.56 Examining the government’s overall approach to the 
reintegration of, Cain writes “It is evident that the Angolan disarmament, 
demobilization, and reintegration program was not completely successful in resettling 
demobilized soldiers in their rural areas of origin. Programs to help excombatants, 
[internally displaced persons], and returning refugees to acquire adequate land to 
resettle have not been adequately implemented to date.”57 In the light of the massive 
expenditure on Aldeia Nova, these figures demonstrate the flaws in the government’s 
approach to national development and reliance on a top-down and modernizationist 
paradigm.  
According to Fernando Pacheco, ideas of large-scale modernization, which 
predominate in the current thinking of the MPLA, are not backed with research into 
what modernization means or what benefit it will bring and to whom. He observes: 
“Everyone wants modernisation, but no one is interested in researching what it 
means.”58 The Aldeia Nova project demonstrates the government’s interest in 
promoting rural development, yet at the same time the government’s top-down, highly 
centralized approach actually hinders large-scale benefit. In this way, the manner in 
which the Angolan state utilizes rent for agricultural and rural development is reflective 
in some ways of Kelsall’s model of centralized neopatrimonial state-led development.59 
The Angolan government’s top-down approach, imported from abroad and 
intended to be a model for rural development across the country, is counter to what most 
experts would advise for promoting meaningful economic and social development. In 
theorizing the 21st century developmental state, Peter Evans writes: 
 
There is no fixed, universal model of how to build a developmental state; 
21st century developmental states will draw on examples from other regions 
and other historical periods as well as on general theories of development, 
but unreflective imports of ready-made models are likely to fail. A ‘cookie 
cutter’ approach to the construction of developmental states – assuming that 
‘one size fits all’ – will fail in the same way that neoliberal, one-size-fits-all, 
cookie-cutter approaches to building effective markets have failed.60 
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As one very well-known Angolan agronomist and development expert put it, 
“the amount of money being spent [on Aldeia Nova] could help small farmers a lot, but 
it is being used very badly. The impact is small and doesn’t correlate to the amount 
spent. In fact, big money in being spent, but it is not having a big impact.”61 The lack of 
transparency and accountability in the project, the lack of sustainability due to a reliance 
on technology and human and material inputs from abroad and the absence of a system 
for monitoring and evaluation has limited the possibilities for rural development. 
According to CEIC, only two percent of total private investment – both foreign and 
domestic – has gone into agriculture.62 This lack of investment in an area serving the 
vast majority of Angolans demonstrates that stronger state intervention is needed to 
ensure the economic development extends to all Angolans. 
 
Conclusion 
 
Angola cannot successfully fight poverty without addressing agriculture and 
small-scale farming. The Aldeia Nova project underscores the need for proper social 
science research and preparation to develop sustainable local solutions and to pay 
attention to the needs of family farmers. Agricultural development cannot proceed on 
the basis of modernizationist one-size-fits-all approach. Rather, it requires local 
empowerment.  
Centro Cultural Mosaiko’s criticism of the Angolan model as modernizationist 
builds on the four models of development suggested by Guy Bajoit: 1) 
modernization/national capitalism; 2) socialism; 3) neoliberalism; and 4) social 
movement or social democracy.63 Although the report is arguing in favour of a 
bottom-up social movement model, the truth is that Angolan development is much 
more complex than these four models, which nevertheless are an excellent opening 
into a more nuanced discussion. 
To begin, the category of the “socialist model” refers to the socialism of the 
Eastern bloc, which was largely a top-down approach to development. Most socialist 
alternatives as they are articulate, however, would involve a social movement and 
bottom-up approach to development. This caveat aside, Bajoit’s first model–of 
modernization or national capitalism–also warrants more attention given the limits of 
the possible that exist in the context of MPLA rule and an elite-driven system of 
accumulation. In other words, some pragmatism is necessary in discussing 
development in practice. It is in this context that top-down state-led development 
becomes worthy of reconsideration. State-led development can of course be socialist 
and can even be bottom-up if the state initiates a genuinely participatory approach to 
development. However, national development under a capitalist paradigm—and even 
under a capitalist and modernizationist paradigm—can have real impacts on people in 
their everyday lives.   
Bajoit saw national capitalism as an outdated model of development built upon 
strong state interference in the economy combined with a lack of democracy. While it 
may be both these things, meaningful engagement and adoption of tactics that 
recognize the balance of forces in Angola may allow the worst aspects of the Angolan 
government’s approach to development to be countered. Much of Angola’s 
development plan, particularly regarding agricultural development, is wrong-headed 
and in need of serious reevaluation. However, with more attention paid by the state to 
agriculture and rural development and concerted advocacy by Angolan non-
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governmental development organizations, the advances that can be made through 
Angola’s state-led development will be a dramatic improvement over what other 
African states have been able to achieve under global neoliberalism.  
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